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ATCA: CLOSING THE GAP IN  
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL WAR CRIMES 
INTRODUCTION 
hen Israel’s 2006 military bombing campaign in Lebanon 
wrought destruction of both the infrastructure of the country as 
well as the natural environment, the environmental impact of warfare 
was once again brought to public consciousness.1 This kind of wanton 
destruction of the environment has been condemned by the international 
community,2 and prohibitions against it are found in several treaties, in-
cluding the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention of 1949 
(“Additional Protocol I”),3 the Convention on the Prohibition of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques (“ENMOD”),4 and the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”).5 However, the lack 
of criminal prosecution for environmental war crimes since Nuremburg6 
                                                                                                             
 1. See, e.g., Hassan M. Fattah, Casualties of War: Lebanon’s Trees, Air and Sea, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/29/world 
/middleeast/29environment.html?ex=1311825600&en=34075758dfbd9790&ei=5088&pa
rtner=rssnyt&emc=rss; Richard Black, Environmental Crisis in Lebanon, BBC NEWS, 
July 31, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/5233358.stm; Bassem Mroue, 
Lebanon Sees Environmental Damage, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/01/AR2006080100672.
html. 
 2. For example, the United Nations (“U.N.”) General Secretary issued a message on 
The International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of the Environment in War and 
Armed Conflict expressing the U.N.’s view that countries in armed conflicts should “nei-
ther exploit[] nor heedlessly damage[] ecosystems in the pursuit of military objectives,” 
and noting that “by and large the environmental consequences of war are overlooked by 
contemporary laws;” the message also declares that “[i]t is high time that we review in-
ternational agreements related to war and armed conflict to ensure that they also cover 
deliberate and unintentional damage to the environment.” Message by the Secretary-
General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, International Day for Preventing the Exploitation of 
the Environment in War and Armed Conflict, Nov. 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/7/27167/P2
7167.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl-i/p6f.xsl&base=/prensa/tpl-i/top-bottom.xsl. 
 3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 [hereinafter Protocol I]. 
 4. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environ-
mental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614 [here-
inafter ENMOD]. 
 5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. 
A/Conf.183 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 6. Carl E. Bruch, All’s Not Fair in (Civil) War: Criminal Liability for Environmental 
Damage in Internal Armed Conflict, 25 VT. L. REV. 695, 716 (2001). 
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suggests that these international agreements do not provide an effective 
deterrent. Furthermore, when military powerhouses such as the United 
States refuse to be a party to most of these conventions,7 it is unlikely 
that criminalization of these acts will succeed as a deterrent. 
Civil liability for such destruction could be more effective. Some suc-
cess in obtaining funds to clean up war-related environmental damage 
has been achieved through the United Nations Compensation Commis-
sion (“UNCC”),8 which adjudicated claims brought against Iraq for ac-
tions it took during the Persian Gulf War. Though this demonstrates that 
civil remedies pursued through international channels might be useful, 
the relatively insubstantial damages recovered indicate potential prob-
lems with the UNCC as a tool of recovery against states.9 In the case of 
Iraq, problems recovering had much to do with Iraq’s initial refusal to 
cooperate with the United Nations.10 Application of the UNCC to future 
civil claims may face additional challenges, namely the requirement that 
a state fulfilling a judgment has sufficient and accessible wealth to draw 
upon for such remedial measures.11 
Taking into consideration the difficulties that inhere when attempting 
to recover monetary relief from a state, it is possible that civil litigation 
against private entities such as corporations could achieve better results. 
There may be more to gain both in terms of financial compensation as 
well as deterrence since the cost of participating in such large scale de-
struction could be prohibitive from the private sector perspective. 
One potential avenue of relief that allows private individuals a right to 
litigate for compensation is the United States Alien Tort Claims Act 
(“ATCA”).12 The ATCA establishes jurisdiction for U.S. district courts 
to hear any civil action by an alien for a tort committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States. Although said to apply 
to “claims in a very limited category,”13 the ATCA has been used with 
increasing frequency to bring charges against both corporations and pri-
                                                                                                             
 7. See Protocol I, supra note 3; see Rome Statute, supra note 5. The United States is 
not a party to Protocol I or the Rome Statute. 
 8. Meredith DuBarry Huston, Wartime Environmental Damages: Financing the 
Clean-up, 23 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 899, 911 (2002) (citing S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)). 
 9. Id. at 915. 
 10. Id. at 915−16. Compensation for the fund was to be derived from thirty percent of 
Iraq’s exports of petroleum and petroleum products, but Iraq refused to comply. Instead, 
frozen oil revenues held by other countries temporarily subsidized the fund. 
 11. Id. (citing Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensa-
tion for Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 291, 301 (2001)). 
 12. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (2003). 
 13. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
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vate individuals accused of violating “the law of nations.” It has met with 
substantial success in actions brought against private individuals who 
engaged in conduct that violated “well-established, universally recog-
nized norms of international law.”14 
This is not to say that the conventions criminalizing certain levels of 
environmental destruction during combat would serve no purpose or 
should never be asserted, but only that the penalty of cleaning up the de-
struction could provide a crucial economic barrier to corporations that 
support military plans entailing great environmental damage. While 
some have argued that litigation is neither effective nor efficient in 
achieving goals that are ostensibly political in nature,15 the pressure ap-
plied to private corporations through prosecution of ATCA claims brings 
public awareness to this crisis, and can deter those that customarily fa-
cilitate unlawful military operations. Furthermore, regular prosecution of 
individuals or corporations for such activities can contribute to the inter-
national consensus that this environmental crime is one that reaches the 
level of universal concern, and thus subjects the perpetrators to a wider 
range of jurisdiction and a greater degree of accountability. 
This Note will argue that the ATCA is an important tool that should be 
utilized to hold private entities, such as corporations, accountable for 
causing serious harm to the environment in the course of an armed con-
flict. In order to protect the environment and the health and well-being of 
all its inhabitants, it is necessary to inhibit the reckless destruction of the 
land and sea. The international community has not yet achieved the will 
or means to do so. Applying punitive measures against those who perpe-
trate environmental war crimes is necessary and the ATCA can provide 
such a precedent. 
Part I of this Note will briefly describe the range of environmental 
damage arising from armed conflict throughout history to the present 
time. Part II will establish the existence of an international prohibition 
against environmental destruction during warfare as evidenced in inter-
national agreements as well as in customary international law. Part III 
will discuss the mechanisms in place to address the deterrence of such 
conduct and examine the shortcomings of these methods. Part IV pre-
sents the ATCA as a viable alternative for discouraging environmental 
harm. Part IV begins with a brief history of the ATCA followed by an 
examination of how courts have responded to ATCA claims, highlighting 
                                                                                                             
 14. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15. Bill Baue, “Win or Lose” in Court, BUSINESS-ETHICS.COM, Summer 2006, avail-
able at http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2006/06winlose.pdf#search=%22ali 
en%20tort%20claims%20act%20pushes%20corporate%20respect%22. 
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potential obstacles litigants may have to overcome. Discussion in this 
section will include the legal argument for holding private entities such 
as corporations liable for environmental torts during war. Part V will dis-
cuss the application of the ATCA to military defense contractors. The 
Note will conclude with a policy argument for utilizing the ATCA in 
U.S. courts, including the need to fill in the gap in accountability for en-
vironmental war crimes so that the perpetrators, and not victims or tax-
payers, will be held fiscally responsible. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARM AS A BYPRODUCT OF 
WARFARE 
The history of environmental destruction during war, intended or inci-
dental, is millennia old and notorious. A few milestones in the history of 
environmental abuse include the alleged salting of the fields of Carthage 
in the second century by the Romans during the Punic Wars,16 the Union 
Army’s burning of thousands of farms and killing of livestock in the Civ-
il War,17 the atomic blast that irradiated Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
forests defoliated by Agent Orange during the Vietnam War,18 and the 
deliberate spilling of millions of gallons of oil into the Persian Gulf and 
the burning of over 500 oil fields by Iraq in the Persian Gulf War.19 More 
recently, the armed conflict between Israel and Lebanon gave rise to yet 
another wartime environmental disaster.20 Fallout from the bombing 
campaign included an 87-mile long oil slick along the Lebanese shore.21 
An estimated total of 35,000 tons of oil in the coastal waters threatened 
the fishing and tourism industries and posed a serious threat to human 
health from toxic substances such as benzene, a known carcinogen.22 As 
a result, Lebanon, a country that prioritized the maintenance of a pristine 
environment, faces the devastation of the entire marine ecosystem on its 
                                                                                                             
 16. Tara Weinstein, Prosecuting Attacks that Destroy the Environment: Environ-
mental Crimes or Humanitarian Atrocities?, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 697, 700 
(2005). 
 17. See Bruch, supra note 6, at 695 (citing BRUCE CATTAN, THE PENGUIN BOOK OF 
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 240 (1960)). 
 18. John Alan Cohan, Modes of Warfare and Evolving Standards of Environmental 
Protection under the International Law of War, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 481, 488 (2003) (cit-
ing Michael N. Schmiit, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of Inter-
national Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 269 (1997)). 
 19. Id. at 488. 
 20. See, e.g., Fattah, supra note 1; Black, supra note 1. 
 21. Anthee Carassava, U.N. Pledges $64 Million for Cleanup of Oil Spill off Lebanon, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/world/ 
middleeast/18spill.html. 
 22. Id. 
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shores.23 Furthermore, there is evidence that Israel, in this latest conflict, 
used weapons that not only produce long term health effects in humans, 
but contaminate the environment.24 Though U.N. forces and concerned 
representatives of countries affected by the spillage have banded together 
to clean up the waters,25 it is unclear how effective these measures will 
be in restoring the ecosystem in the affected areas and preventing death 
or sickness from exposure to the chemical substances in the water, or 
how much money will ultimately be needed to sustain such a clean up.26 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION DURING WAR IS DELIMITED BY 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The international community has for centuries recognized various rules 
of war, otherwise known as jus in bello,27 some of which apply indirectly 
to environmental destruction.28 Among these rules are three relevant 
principles: necessity, proportionality, and humanity.29 Military necessity 
                                                                                                             
 23. In particular, the endangered turtles that hatch on the beaches in July are threat-
ened, as well as the beds along the shore where tuna spawn. Mroue, supra note 1. Mroue 
also points out that Lebanon has taken steps to combat the effects of pollution, unlike 
many of its neighbors in the Middle East. For example, Lebanon has laws that prohibit 
diesel minibuses and that curtail factory pollution. Id. This demonstrates how easily an 
aggressor country using military force against another can destroy in a few hours the 
benefits of any environmental progress made over the years by the country it attacks. 
 24. Dr. Doug Rokke, Bunker Buster Bombs Containing Depleted Uranium Warheads 
Used By Israel Against Civilian Targets In Lebanon, GLOBAL RESEARCH, July 26, 2006, 
available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=ROK2 
0061106&articleId=3748; Israel Detonated a Radioactive Bunker Buster Bomb in Leba-
non: What Kind of Weapon Leaves Traces of Radiation & Produces Such Lethal & Cir-
cumscribed Consequences?, GLOBAL RESEARCH, Nov. 11, 2006, available at http://www. 
globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20061111&articleId=3813. 
 25. Carassava, supra note 21. 
 26. In August 2007, the Christian Science Monitor reported that the government of 
Lebanon had collected sixty to seventy percent of the oil spill but was unable to complete 
the clean up due to a lack of funding. Carol Huang, Oil Legacy of War Mars Lebanon 
Coast, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Aug. 23, 2007, available at http://www. 
csmonitor.com/2007/0823/p06s02-wome.htm. Free-floating oil is still drifting ashore, 
and the oil that remains on the shore and seafloor is reentering the sea. Id. 
 27. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 686 (1900) (discussing the applica-
tion of international law governing the capture of fishing vessels during wartime). 
 28. See, e.g., The Hague Convention II Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23, 
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/law 
ofwar/hague02.htm (prohibiting the employment of “poison or poisoned arms” and the 
destruction or seizure of “the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”). 
 29. Cohan, supra note 18, at 491 (citing Capt. William A. Wilcos, Jr., Environmental 
Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 299, 302 (1993)). See also Protocol I, supra note 
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justifies applying any force required to win the complete and timely 
submission of the enemy without violating the laws of war.30 The propor-
tionality principle “prohibits methods of warfare likely to cause injury to 
civilians in excess of any concrete direct military advantage,”31 while the 
humanity principle prohibits “means of warfare that are inhumane.”32 
The application of these principles to environmental destruction was as-
serted by members of the U.N. when the Security Council passed Reso-
lution 687, which held Iraq liable for “any direct loss, damage, including 
environmental damage, and the depletion of natural resources” caused by 
the Iraqi invasion.33 For example, the United States asserted that, with 
respect to this damage, Iraq had violated the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.34 
The international community also has several international agreements 
in place that delimit the range of environmental destruction tolerated dur-
ing war. Some of the earlier conventions address the environment indi-
rectly. For example, the Hague Convention of 1907 prohibits the use of 
“poison or poisoned weapons,” and the destruction or seizure of “the en-
emy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively de-
manded by the necessities of war.”35 These principles were applied after 
WWII to hold German industrialists who had over-exploited Polish for-
ests for timber accountable.36 
                                                                                                             
3. Protocol I limits military conduct in many instances to that deemed “necessary.” For 
example, see articles 14(3)(b), 54(5), 62(1). Id. 
 30. Capt. William A. Wilcos, Jr., Environmental Protection in Combat, 17 S. ILL. U. 
L.J. 299, 302 (1993). 
 31. Cohan, supra note 18, at 494 (citing Stephanie N. Simonds, Conventional War-
fare and Environmental Protection: A Proposal for International Legal Reform, 29 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 165, 168 (1992)). 
 32. Id. at 495 (citing the Declaration of St. Petersburg Renouncing the Use, in Time 
of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes in Weight, Nov. 29, 1868). 
 33. Lt. Col. Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment Of The Environmental 
Law Of International Armed Conflict, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 27 (S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991)). 
 34. Id. at 27–28. However, there was not a consensus: “Other states referred to Proto-
col I and ENMOD, while a third group suggested that peacetime environmental law car-
ried forward into periods of hostilities and applied in the case of the Gulf War.” Id. 
 35. Article 23(a) prohibits the use of “poison or poisoned weapons,” while article 
23(h) deals with destruction or seizure of the enemy’s property. The Hague Convention 
IV Laws and Customs of War on Land, art 23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Con-
sol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Convention IV]. 
 36. Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modern 
Warfare: Customary Substance Over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
479, 486−87 (1993). 
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Recognition of the seriousness of environmental harm grew when the 
world witnessed the devastation of Vietnam’s forests by the use of the 
herbicide Agent Orange, and thus the international community formu-
lated conventions that would more directly address such environmental 
destruction.37 The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, the 
Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, and the Rome Statute all con-
tain language that makes it a violation of international law to exceed cer-
tain bounds of environmental destruction resulting from military com-
bat.38 In addition, the international community has sought to prosecute 
such violations through statutes adhering to ad hoc tribunals created to 
punish war crimes violations. For example, article 13(b)(5) of the Iraqi 
Statute contains language similar to the above-mentioned treaties.39 
III. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS PROSCRIBING ENVIRONMENTAL 
DESTRUCTION LACK EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 
The fact that neither states nor individuals have been held accountable 
for war-related environmental crimes since Nuremburg,40 and that in-
tense environmental destruction, as seen in the recent war between Israel 
and Lebanon, continues without fear of retribution illustrates the ineffec-
tiveness of these treaties as a deterrent. 
Several reasons have been put forth to explain why these conventions 
have not been successful tools in prosecuting environmental war crimes. 
First of all, the language addressing the limits of environmental harm in 
                                                                                                             
 37. Cohan, supra note 18, at 485. See also Caggiano, supra note 36 at 488 (“The 
nations of the world drafted [the Environmental Modification Convention] in response to 
the massive, albeit unsuccessful attempts by the United States to use weather modifica-
tion to harass the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam war.”) (citing Stockholm Inter-
national Peace Research Institute (Sipri), WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 59 (1977)). 
 38. Weinstein, supra note 16 (citing Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any 
Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 
333, T.I.A.S. No. 9614; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 
U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977); Rome Statute, supra note 5. 
 39. Id. at 706. 
 40. During the Nuremberg proceedings, General Alfred Jodl was found guilty of “war 
crimes associated with scorched earth tactics in Northern Norway, Leningrad, and Mos-
cow,” while certain German civilian officials were tried for “ruthless exploitation of Pol-
ish forestry.” Bruch, supra note 6 at 716 (citing the Trial of German Major War Crimi-
nals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany, 
pt.22, at 517 (1950) and Aaron Schwabach, Environmental Damage Resulting From The 
Nato Military Action Against Yugoslavia, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 117, 125 (citing United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, Case No. 7150 496 (1948)). 
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both the Additional Protocol I and the Rome Statute has been described 
as too vague and undefined.41 Both agreements proscribe “widespread, 
long-term and severe” damage to the natural environment.42 The problem 
is the difficulty of articulating what widespread, long-term and severe 
mean.43 Furthermore, the requirement that all three factors, (wide-spread, 
long-term, and severe) must be demonstrated, establishes a high thresh-
old for criminal prosecution. Finally, with respect to the Rome Statute, 
prosecution of military actors is difficult due to two other features of the 
statute: it balances military concerns against environmental integrity and 
requires proof of intent. Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute makes it 
a crime when  
[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to ci-
vilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natu-
ral environment which would be excessive in relation to the concrete 
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.  
The Rome Statute essentially tolerates environmental destruction when 
it is undertaken to secure a military advantage, and is not “clearly exces-
sive,” a term itself undefined. It is also unclear whether the “anticipated” 
advantage is to be gauged on an objective or subjective standard. If 
judged on a subjective standard, this would also create problems of 
proof.44 The challenges that arise from this potential subjective standard 
for judging military advantage are augmented by the need to prove that 
an accused had knowledge that the environmental destruction in question 
would result from the attack. In sum, it must be proven that 1) the indi-
vidual responsible had knowledge that the attack would cause such dam-
age and 2) that the perpetrator acted willingly to cause such destruction, 
a much higher standard than that of recklessness or negligence.45 In addi-
tion, because the Rome Statute, which is applied through the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (“ICC”), cannot supersede national procedures, the 
                                                                                                             
 41. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 707; Cohan, supra note 18, at 502. 
 42. Protocol I, supra note 3; Rome Statute, supra note 5. 
 43. Huston, supra note 8, at 906. “Long-lasting” in the ENMOD Convention has been 
interpreted in Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as 
constituting a period of months or a season, while the Commentary to Protocol I defines 
long-lasting as “matter of decades.” See ENMOD, Understanding Relating to article 1, 
supra note 4; Protocol I, supra note 3.  
 44. Mark A. Drumbl, International Human Rights, International Humanitarian Law, 
and Environmental Security: Can the International Criminal Court Bridge the Gaps?, 6 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 319−21 (2000). 
 45. Id. at 322. 
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ICC is precluded from asserting jurisdiction in countries with functioning 
legal mechanisms that can address environmental crimes.46 
The Additional Protocol and Rome Statute share the further drawback 
that neither has been ratified by the United States,47 a nation whose par-
ticipation in large-scale military activities worldwide48 makes its absence 
particularly notable and troubling in terms of deterring environmental 
damage through criminal prosecution. Though ENMOD has been ratified 
by the United States, and has the further advantages of more precisely 
defining the words “widespread, long-lasting or severe” and proscribing 
environmental harm without regard to military necessity or advantage, it 
has been held to ban only manipulation of the environment as a weapon, 
as opposed to destruction of the environment as a collateral effect or in-
tentional act.49 
                                                                                                             
 46. JOE SILLS, JEROME C. GLENN, ELIZABETH FLORESCU & THEODORE J. GORDON, U.S. 
ARMY ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IN MILITARY 
ACTIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)—U.N. PERSPECTIVES (APRIL 
2001), available at http://www.acunu.org/millennium/es-icc.html. 
 47. Protocol I, supra note 3; Rome statute, supra note 5. 
 48. For example, the United States supplied most of the weapons used by Israel in its 
recent bombing campaign against Lebanon. DEMOCRACY NOW!: U.S. Arming of Is-
rael: How U.S. Weapons Manufacturers Profit From Middle East Conflict, Interview 
with Frida Berrigan, a Senior Research Associate with the Arms Trade Resource Center 
and at the World Policy Institute [hereinafter U.S. Arming of Israel], http://www. 
democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=06/07/21/1432202 (last visited Dec. 29, 2007). These 
weapons are “part of a multimillion-dollar arms sale package approved last year that 
Israel is able to draw on as needed.” David S. Cloud & Helene Cooper, U.S. Speeds Up 
Bomb Delivery for the Israelis, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/22/world/middleeast/22military.html?ex=1311220800
&en=e256f1d8872a835d&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc. 
 49. Cohan, supra note 18, at 519 (citing Understanding Relating to Article I, Report 
of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 
27, at 91–92, U.N. Doc. A/31/27 (1976)). 
 It is the understanding of the Committee that, for the purposes of this Conven-
tion, the terms “widespread,” “long-lasting” and “severe” shall be interpreted as 
follows: (a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hun-
dred square kilometers; (b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or 
approximately a season; (c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disrup-
tion or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other assets. It is 
further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively 
for this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the 
same or similar terms if used in connection with any other international agree-
ment.”  
Id.  
638 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
Given the lack of clear guidelines and the heavy burdens of proof in 
conventions addressing environmental war crimes, it is not surprising 
that international criminal tribunals such as the ICC have failed to prose-
cute these crimes. Ad hoc tribunals are not well equipped to prosecute 
war crimes either, since most of the tribunals are not directly empowered 
to charge individuals for environmental destruction50 and thus must rely 
on the conventions cited above. For example, the prosecutor for the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) failed to prose-
cute NATO for potential violations of articles 35 and 55 of Additional 
Protocol I upon recommendation of the Committee Established to Re-
view the NATO Bombing Campaign, which had determined that the 
NATO bombing had not reached the threshold level of Additional Proto-
col I and that military necessity could have played a role in choosing tar-
gets.51 
While criminal charges of environmental crimes seem to encounter in-
surmountable burdens of proof to prosecute, civil liability for such 
crimes has been established with some success through at least one nota-
ble mechanism. Iraq’s liability for its “unlawful” invasion of Kuwait and 
the resulting loss to “foreign government, nationals and corporations,” 
including “environmental damage and the depletion of natural re-
sources,” was declared in the Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 
687, and through Resolution 692, the UNCC was established to adminis-
ter payments.52 
                                                                                                             
The last line indicates a reluctance to allow the standards defined here to apply in any 
other context, and thereby become an international standard. 
 50. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 704−05. Weinstein points out that none of the fol-
lowing are either directly charged with or have jurisdiction over crimes against the envi-
ronment: the Internal Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary 
Chambers for Cambodia, and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone. Id. 
 51. Weinstein, supra note 16, at 704 (citing Final Report to the Prosecutor by the 
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Final Report) ¶¶ 14−25, available at http://www.un.org 
/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm). The Final Report argues that prosecution of NATO for 
war crimes is not warranted on several grounds, namely that (1) France and the United 
States have not ratified Additional Protocol I; (2) application of articles 35 and 55 is “ex-
tremely stringent and their scope and contents imprecise” and that the cumulative stan-
dard contributes to this high threshold for application; and (3) that the difficulty of prov-
ing the mens rea of intentionality as well as the balancing factor of military necessity 
and/or advantage led the Commission to its decision not to recommend prosecution of 
NATO for environmental war crimes. Id. 
 52. Huston, supra note 8, at 911 (citing S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 
(1991)). 
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Though the UNCC can be termed successful in some respects, having 
awarded $14 trillion in compensation to 1,506,458 claimants,53 there 
were some drawbacks to this mechanism. First of all, out of the six cate-
gories of claims (A through F) established by the UNCC to compensate 
individuals, corporations, governments and international organizations, 
the category F claims for environmental damages were the lowest prior-
ity of claims.54 The fact that ten years passed before the first award of 
environmental damages illustrates this well.55 Cash flow was also a prob-
lem in distributing the awards as Iraq was not cooperative in exporting 
the oil that would generate revenue for the fund.56 What is of greater 
concern is whether the UNCC is a viable type of mechanism to compen-
sate for environmental losses by other violators, such as Israel, or for that 
matter, Hezbollah, whose rockets burned thousands of acres of Israeli 
forests.57 It is especially problematic to extract the necessary funding for 
such clean-ups from non-state entities in terms of gaining access to their 
wealth.58 What is promising about the UNCC though is that the claims 
brought against Iraq for environmental harms considered not justifiable 
by military necessity and violative of the laws of proportionality, as ar-
gued by the United States, and violative of Additional Protocol I and 
ENMOD, as argued by other states,59 strengthen the argument that cus-
tomary law prohibits excessive environmental destruction inflicted dur-
ing war. 
IV. THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AND AN ANALYSIS OF DOCTRINES 
LIMITING ITS APPLICATION 
The Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), enacted in 1789, states that 
“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an 
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”60 The ATCA was little known or employed 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 917. 
 54. Id. at 912. 
 55. Id. at 913. 
 56. Id. at 915–16. 
 57. Dina Kraft, Dry Forests in Northern Israel are Damaged as Hezbollah’s Rocket 
Attacks Ignite Fires, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2006/08/08/world/middleeast/08fires.html. An estimated 9000 acres of land and 
almost 3000 acres of forest have been damaged by fire resulting from the firing of rockets 
across the Israeli-Lebanon border. 
 58. Huston, supra note 8, at 919. Huston cites Al Qaeda as an example of a terrorist 
organization that caused environmental damage in the September 11 attack and the diffi-
culties in “identify[ing] and gain[ing] access to all their funding sources.” Id. 
 59. Schmitt, supra note 33, at 27−28. 
 60. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350. 
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until 1978 when Paraguayan immigrants living in the United States 
brought suit against a former Paraguayan policeman, Filartiga, who they 
accused of torturing and killing their son in Paraguay years earlier.61 Fi-
lartiga established that the court had jurisdiction over claims that violated 
“universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights”62 
and that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority” 
fell within that category.63 That such torture was a violation of univer-
sally accepted norms was proven by the “numerous international agree-
ments, and the renunciation of torture as an instrument of official policy 
by virtually all of the nations of the world (in principle if not in prac-
tice).”64 The court rejected the appellee’s claim “that the law of nations 
forms a part of the laws of the United States only to the extent that Con-
gress has acted to define it.”65 
The Second Circuit ruling in Kadic v. Karadzic expanded liability un-
der the ATCA to include private actors for certain violations of interna-
tional law,66 including genocide67 and war crimes such as “murder, rape, 
torture, and arbitrary detention of civilians.”68 Private entities such as 
corporations have also been deemed liable for violations of international 
law under the ATCA.69 
However, there are ways in which courts have narrowed the scope of 
jurisdiction over ATCA claims. The courts may narrow the scope of 
                                                                                                             
 61. Anne-Marie Slaughter and David L. Bosco, Alternative Justice, GLOBAL POLICY 
FORUM, http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2001/altjust.htm, last visited Mar. 4, 
2008. See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 62. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 880. 
 65. Id. at 886−87. 
 66. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995). The court relied on the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §404 
(1986) [hereinafter FOREL] to identify crimes for which individuals may be held liable 
under international law. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240. 
 67. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 242. 
 68. Id. at 242−44. 
 69. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff’s alle-
gations of the corporate defendant’s complicity in forced labor, murder, and rape, if prov-
en, sufficiently alleged violations of international law under the ATCA); Presbyterian 
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(finding that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged human rights violations including torture, en-
slavement, war crimes, and genocide); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs alleging that an international mining company, with state assistance, 
committed violations against international law including “racial discrimination, environ-
mental devastation, war crimes and crimes against humanity”). 
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what can determine international law70 or narrowly construe the range of 
violations of international law cognizable under the ATCA.71 Further-
more, the courts will limit the application of the ATCA against private 
individuals when they determine that the alleged violation of interna-
tional law does not apply to non-state actors.72 ATCA claims have also 
been rejected based on claims of forum non conveniens,73 exhaustion 
requirements,74 or domestic and foreign policy considerations.75 
Several jurisdictional bases for ATCA claims were narrowed under the 
Supreme Court case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.76 First, the Court, re-
stricting the kinds of claims cognizable under ATCA, found that it had 
no jurisdiction under the ATCA to hear the appellee’s claims because 
they did not fall within the “handful of heinous actions” that “violate[] 
definable, universal and obligatory norms,”77 and hence there was no 
violation of “customary international law so well defined as to support 
the creation of a federal remedy.”78 In addition, the Court determined that 
international agreements upon which the claimant relied to establish that 
                                                                                                             
 70. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734−35 (2004). 
 71. Id. at 732−733. 
 72. Kadic, 70 F.3d. at 243−44 (holding that individuals are only liable for torture if 
acting in an official capacity). 
 73. Aguinda v. Texaco, 303 F.3d 470, 476−480 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 74. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 75. See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 
47−48 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733. 
 76. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697, 736−37 (finding that the ATCA did not provide jurisdic-
tion for Alvarez’s arbitrary detention claim when the claimant was abducted in Mexico 
and brought to the U.S. for a criminal trial). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s holding that “[t]he unilateral, nonconsensual extraterritorial arrest and detention of 
Alvarez were arbitrary and in violation of the law of nations under the ATCA.” Alvarez-
Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003). A central difference in judi-
cial opinion revolves around the question of whether The Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights (“UDHR”) and/or the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”) can impose obligations on the United States to recognize arbitrary detention 
as a violation of international law. The 9th Circuit holds that they do impose such obliga-
tions in Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 620−21, while the Supreme Court said that the 
UDHR does not impose obligations on its own and that the ICCPR was not self-
executing. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734−35. 
 77. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732−733 (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 
774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 78. Id. at 738. The Court also held that “that federal courts should not recognize pri-
vate claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with 
less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms 
familiar when § 1350 was enacted.” Id. at 732. Those historical paradigms were said to 
include “offenses against ambassadors,” “violations of safe conduct,” and “individual 
actions arising out of prize captures and piracy.” Id. at 720. 
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arbitrary arrest was a violation of international law did not support his 
claim, namely, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 
and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). 
The Court concluded that the UDHR has “moral authority” but does not 
impose specific legal obligations, and that the ICCPR was not held to be 
self-executing by the United States and therefore requires further Con-
gressional action to enforce any of its precepts.79 The Court also rejected 
the appellee’s assertion of binding customary law based on the prohibi-
tion against arbitrary detention in several state constitutions, as well as 
judicial rulings on both an international and national (U.S.) level. The 
Court maintained that the norm against arbitrary detention illustrated in 
state constitutions was at “a high level of generality,” and that the Court 
was unwilling to assert its federal judicial discretion over an arbitrary 
detention claim based on customary international law.80 Finally, the 
Court suggested that exhaustion of international tort claims may require 
exhaustion in domestic courts or in other international tribunals.81 
The argument that the ATCA was originally intended to cover a lim-
ited range of claims asserting violations of the law of nations has been 
made by several courts.82 However, the bar has not been set so high as to 
eliminate claims that do not rise to the level of jus cogens.83 Of course 
                                                                                                             
 79. Sosa, 542 U.S at 734−35. 
 80. Id. at 736−37 n.27. 
 81. Id. at 733 n.21. The Court cites the argument in the European Commission amicus 
curiae’s brief that “basic principles of international law require that before asserting a 
claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the 
domestic legal system, and perhaps in others such as international claims tribunals.” Id. 
 82. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887−88; Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719−20 (relying on An Act for 
the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States § 8, 1 Stat. 113−114 and id. 
§28, at 118, to infer that Congress intended to restrict ATCA jurisdiction to a “relatively 
modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations” including “offenses 
against ambassadors,” “violations of safe conduct,” as well as “prize captures and pi-
racy”). However, the Court in Sosa concedes that a consensus understanding of Congres-
sional intent with respect to private actions subject to the jurisdictional provision of the 
ATCA has proven elusive. Id. at 718−19. See also In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 
46−47. 
 83. Under article 53 of the Vienna Convention, a jus cogens (or peremptory) norm is: 
“a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as 
a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a sub-
sequent norm of general international law having the same character.” Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, article 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter 
Vienna Convention]. The Court in Sosa does not discuss whether or not the violation 
must rise to the level of a jus cogens violation. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692. The court in Unocal 
asserted that “[a]lthough a jus cogens violation is, by definition, a violation of specific, 
universal, and obligatory international norms that is actionable under the ATCA, any 
violation of specific, universal, and obligatory international norms—jus cogens or not—is 
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the ultimate decision at to whether a given violation rises to the level of a 
norm that is “definable, universal and obligatory”84 is based on what 
sources of international law the court is willing to accept. In Sosa, the 
Supreme Court’s cursory rejection of the internationally recognized dec-
larations and agreements cited to support the ATCA claims was founded 
on insubstantial analysis compared to other jurisprudence.85 Furthermore, 
the Court refused to acknowledge appropriate sources of customary in-
ternational law86 on the grounds that the norms thus embodied in various 
documents were too general,87 and that courts that have held otherwise 
simply go further than the Supreme Court was willing to go,88 suggesting 
that the Court circumscribed the limits based on nothing more than its 
own desire to do so. 
With regard to non-state actors, courts have determined that liability 
under the ATCA is limited to “certain forms of conduct [that] violate the 
law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of 
a state or only as private individuals.”89 Included among those violations 
                                                                                                             
actionable under the ATCA.” Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945, n.15 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotes and citations omitted). 
 84. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781). 
 85. The Sosa court cites one source to support its assertion that the UDHR is merely 
moral authority; the Court references Eleanor Roosevelt’s statement that the UDHR is 
“not a treaty or international agreement . . . impos[ing] legal obligations.” Sosa, 542 U.S. 
at 734−35. This is in notable contrast to the evidence cited by the Filartiga court that the 
UDHR provides much more than moral authority. The Filartiga court cites several U.N. 
issued statements regarding the U.N. Charter, which include the statement that a U.N. 
Declaration is “a formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when princi-
ples of great and lasting importance are being enunciated” (emphasis added) and that 
“insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by 
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States.” Filartiga, 630 
F.2d at 883 (citing 34 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 8) 15, U.N. Doc. E/cn.4/1/610 (1962)). 
Filartiga also cites a source that states that the UDHR “no longer fits into the dichotomy 
of ‘binding treaty’ against ‘non-binding pronouncement’ but is rather an authoritative 
statement of the international community.” Id. at 883 (citing E. Schwelb, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 70 (1964)). 
 86. Such sources of customary law have been held to consist of “general and consis-
tent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation,” which in turn 
can be established by international agreements inasmuch as they represent the practice of 
states. In addition, general principles of law, as practiced by states on a domestic level 
“may sometimes convert such a principle into a rule of customary law.” FOREL, supra 
note 66, § 102. Thus the Court’s cursory rejection of the UDHR, the ICCPR and the do-
mestic law of states is misguided. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734−35. 
 87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736−37 n.27. 
 88. Id. at 737 n.27. 
 89. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239. To support its assertion that liability exists for non-state 
actors, the court relies on historical evidence that individuals such as pirates were prose-
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are genocide, war crimes, and forced labor, while torture is an act that 
only makes those acting in an official capacity liable under the ATCA.90 
However, several theories exist for holding private actors liable when 
they are intertwined with state actors who violate international law, thus 
broadening the scope of liability for private actors.91 This issue is par-
ticularly relevant for holding corporate actors liable under the ATCA for 
violations that do not violate peremptory norms.92 With respect to envi-
ronmental war crime, there is evidence that it has not reached that level 
of universal condemnation.93 
The exhaustion requirement that the Supreme Court in Sosa mentions 
in passing was not applicable there,94 but has been discussed in other 
                                                                                                             
cuted under the law of nations (citing United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 153, 161 
(1820)). The Court cites the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (1986), which states that “[i]ndividuals may be held liable for offenses 
against international law, such as piracy, war crimes, and genocide.” FOREL, supra note 
66, pt. II, introductory note. The court goes on to note the Restatement’s extension to 
other violations of “universal concern.” Id. at 239−40. 
 90. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241−44 (finding that genocide and war crimes constitute viola-
tions of international law for which individuals are liable; also finding that torture is not 
included in this category); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 946–948 (finding that private actors are 
liable for forced labor under the ATCA). 
 91. Theories that expand private actors’ liability under international law include the 
joint-action theory, acting under color of law, and aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Presby-
terian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 328 (finding that private actors are “considered state 
actors if they are willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents”) (cita-
tions omitted); Kadic, 70 F. 3d at 245 (finding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[a] private 
individual acts under color of law within the meaning of section 1983 when he acts to-
gether with state officials or with significant state aid”) (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069, 1078 n.5 (2006) 
(holding that “violations of the laws of nations have always encompassed vicarious liabil-
ity”). 
 92. Peremptory norms are also known as jus cogens norms. See Vienna Convention, 
supra note 83, art. 53. 
 93. For example, FOREL § 404 cmt. (a) states that “[u]niversal jurisdiction over the 
specified offenses is a result of universal condemnation of those activities and general 
interest in cooperating to suppress them, as reflected in widely-accepted international 
agreements and resolutions of international organizations. These offenses are subject to 
universal jurisdiction as a matter of customary law.” It includes violations such as “pi-
racy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps 
certain acts of terrorism . . . .” Id. It may be difficult at this stage to show that environ-
mental war crimes are proscribed in widely accepted international agreements. 
 94. The Court made reference to the amicus brief of the European Commission, 
which asserted that “basic principles of international law require that before asserting a 
claim in a foreign forum, the claimant must have exhausted any remedies available in the 
domestic legal system, and perhaps in other forums such as international claims tribu-
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cases.95 Though exhaustion is clearly an element of the Torture Victims 
Protection Act (“TVPA”) (codified under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 like the 
ATCA),96 there is no clear consensus among courts that it need apply to 
other claims brought under the ATCA.97 It is thus not an insurmountable 
barrier. Furthermore, even if a court did require exhaustion, this would 
be excused in cases in which the plaintiff’s efforts in the forum state 
would be futile.98 
Other courts have accepted defendants’ motions to dismiss ATCA 
claims arguing on forum non conveniens grounds.99 The two-prong test 
                                                                                                             
nals.” However, the Court did not deem it appropriate to apply in the case at hand. Sosa, 
542 U.S. at 733 n.21. 
 95. See, e.g., Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1089−90. 
 96. The TVPA states that “[a] court shall decline to hear a claim under this section if 
the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the 
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350. 
 97. For example, the court in Sarei refused to require exhaustion because it found that 
the legislative history of the ATCA did not reflect unambiguously Congress’s intent that 
“international exhaustion was required . . . before an ATCA claim could be heard in a 
U.S. court.” Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1093. The Sarei court also points out the lack of consensus 
in several ATCA cases. Id. at 1089. It cites decisions that do not require exhaustion, see, 
e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544−58 (9th Cir. 2005); In re Estate of Fer-
dinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467−76 (9th Cir. 1994), as well as opin-
ions that do suggest that exhaustion might be appropriate under the ATCA, see, e.g., 
Judge Cudahy’s opinion in Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F. 3d 877, 889−90 (7th Cir. 2005). 
Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1089. However, the Sarei court concludes that because Congress has 
not clearly mandated exhaustion for ATCA claims, “sound judicial discretion” governs 
whether or not exhaustion will be required. Id. at 1090. 
 98. See Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 343 n.44 (finding that no precedent 
exists for enforcing exhaustion requirements when efforts to do so would be futile). 
 99. See Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 476−80; Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 253 F. Supp. 
2d 510, 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). This has been an especially effective defense in cases in-
volving environmental pollution. Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of The Alien Tort 
Claims Act: How an Old Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdepend-
ence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 181−85 (2005) (citing Jeffrey B. Gracer, Protecting Citizens of 
Other Countries, in THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES 
TO ADDRESS DISPROPORTIONATE RISK 727–28 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999). In foot-
note 314, Londis cites Gerrard’s string cite of cases to illustrate the frequency of dis-
missal of environmental claims on forum non conveniens grounds: Torres v. Southern 
Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing toxic tort suit brought by 
700 Peruvian citizens against copper company); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant 
Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part, modified in part, 809 F.2d 
1295 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 871 (1987) (dismissing action against Union 
Carbide for a catastrophic leak of methyl icocyanate in Bhopal, India); Delgado v. Shell 
Oil Co., 890 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (dismissing actions brought by farm workers 
from 23 countries alleging chemical exposure); Sequihua v. Texaco, 847 F. Supp. 61 
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (dismissing suit Ecuadoreans alleging massive air, soil, and water con-
tamination). Id. at 182 n.314. 
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applied by the courts100 tends to favor the defendants in ATCA cases be-
cause the first prong considers the adequacy of the alternative forum rec-
ommended by the defendant, and in the interests of comity, U.S. courts 
are reluctant to offend the foreign state by finding it inadequate.101 There 
is clearly some overlap between finding exhaustion claims futile and the 
ruling under the doctrine of forum non conveniens claim that the foreign 
forum is inadequate. Thus a plaintiff could prevail on both motions to 
dismiss if it is demonstrated that no feasible alternative forum exists. 
With respect to the second prong of the forum non conveniens test, bal-
ancing public and private interest in litigating in the chosen forum, courts 
may consider the policy interest of the United States in determining pub-
lic interest and could find that dismissal on this basis may “frustrate 
Congress’s intent to provide a federal forum for aliens suing domestic 
entities for violation of the law of nations.”102 Thus, the policy interests 
of the United States could play a role in determining the public interest in 
allowing a U.S. forum for adjudication.103 
One of the main barriers to ATCA claims is the reluctance of courts to 
interfere with U.S. foreign policy.104 Two prudential doctrines that courts 
draw upon in assessing whether the judiciary can assert itself in a given 
                                                                                                             
 100. The court “first considers whether an adequate forum exists. If so, it must then 
balance a series of factors involving the private interests of the parties in maintaining the 
litigation in the competing fora and any public interests at stake.” Aguinda, 303 F.3d at 
476 (internal quotes and citations omitted). Private interests have been held to include 
access to evidence and witness amenability, while public interest factors consider the 
public’s interest in the controversy as well as the administrative burden placed on courts 
in presiding over the case and applying foreign law. Londis, supra note 99, at 182 (citing 
Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 101. Londis, supra note 99, at 185. Londis also points out that dismissal on these pro-
cedural grounds may also be favored because it is less controversial than prudential doc-
trines such as the political question. Id. at 185. 
 102. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Jota 
v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 159 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 103. For example, the court in Wiwa views the TVPA as expressing a policy in favor 
of allowing U.S. federal courts jurisdiction over cases of torture. Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105. 
Factors also cited by the court in overturning the dismissal on grounds of forum non con-
veniens included the fact that two plaintiffs were residents of the United States, the “very 
substantial expense and inconvenience” that would be imposed on the plaintiffs were the 
suit to be dismissed in favor of the foreign forum, and that the inconvenience to the de-
fendants was minimal. Id. at 106. 
 104. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 48 (finding that allowing the suit 
to proceed would interfere with the U.S. government’s negotiation of war reparations 
with Vietnam, thus “impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in managing foreign affairs”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
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ATCA case are the political question doctrine and act of state doctrine.105 
The political question doctrine consists of a six factor test that focuses 
primarily on whether a judicial decision would undermine the authority 
of the executive or legislative branches.106 The act of state doctrine fo-
cuses more specifically on the consequences a judgment regarding a for-
eign state may have on U.S. foreign policy.107 However, courts have held 
that political questions do not automatically prevent courts from deter-
mining the legality of executive action.108 An implicit part of the court’s 
determination of how much weight to give this factor is the political 
pressure applied to the judiciary by the executive branch.109 
                                                                                                             
 105. The act of state and/or political question doctrines have been invoked in a number 
of notable ATCA cases. See, e.g., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 796; Kadic, 70 F.3d at 248−49; 
In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 48; Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1079, 1084. 
 106. The six factors discussed in Baker v. Carr are:  
(1) the matter is constitutionally committed to a coordinate branch of govern-
ment; (2) no “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” exist to guide 
the court’s analysis; (3) it is impossible to decide the case without making an 
initial policy determination that should rightfully be made by a separate branch; 
(4) deciding the case would express “a lack of respect” to a coordinate branch 
of government; (5) there is “an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made;” or (6) the potential embarrassment to the U.S. 
government could arise as a result of “multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.”  
Londis, supra note 99, at 186 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). In Sarei, 
the court addressed factors one, four, five and six. Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1079. 
 107. The act of state doctrine “prevents U.S. courts from inquiring into the validity of 
the public acts of a recognized sovereign power committed within its own territory.” 
Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1084 (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 
(1964)). Thus an action may be dismissed if “(1) there is an ‘official act of a foreign sov-
ereign performed within its own territory’; and (2) ‘the relief sought or the defense inter-
posed [would require] a court in the United States to declare invalid the [foreign sover-
eign’s] official act.’” Id. at 1084 (citing W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tec-
tonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990)). 
 108. “[I]t is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign rela-
tions lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Londis, supra note 99, at 186 (citing Baker, 369 
U.S. at 211). Courts should investigate the history of the issue in question to determine 
whether it is “susceptible to ‘judicial handling’ and consider ‘other possible conse-
quences of judicial action.’” Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211−12). 
 109. Londis notes that statements of interest by the State and Justice Departments have 
been influential in the courts’ decision to allow ATCA claims to proceed. In particular, 
Londis observes that the Carter Administration supported Filartiga and that the Clinton 
Administration supported plaintiffs in Kadic and Unocal; the author contrasts that with 
the position of the Bush Administration, which did not support plaintiffs in Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil, nor in Sarei v. Rio Tinto. The successful suits were ones in which the executive 
branch had not argued against the plaintiffs. Londis, supra note 99, at 188−91 (cases 
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V. APPLICATION OF THE ATCA AGAINST MILITARY DEFENSE 
CONTRACTORS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL WAR CRIMES 
In an ATCA case brought against military defense contractors, defen-
dants would seek to invoke one or more of these barriers. The defenses 
they are most likely to rely on include the claim that environmental 
harms do not constitute the “handful of heinous crimes” cognizable un-
der the ATCA.110 Further, they might allege that even if such violations 
are cognizable under the ATCA, they are not jus cogens violations and 
thus require state action; state action could then suffice to persuade 
judges that the suit infringes on the government’s right to determine for-
eign policy.111 The problem of state action will be discussed below, 
where it is maintained that the defendants’ actions are clearly implicated 
in illegal state conduct. 
As U.S. defense contractors are among the leaders in weapons manu-
facturing internationally,112 it is likely that they could be defendants in 
                                                                                                             
cited include Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876; Kadic, 70 F.3d 232; Nat’l Coalition Government of 
the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 340 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Doe v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp. (No. 01-1357) (D.D.C. filed June 20, 2001); Sarei, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 
1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002)). The court’s decision with respect to the political question issue in 
Sarei was overruled. Sarei, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). The court found that the 
statement of interest provided by the government did not establish that a political ques-
tion precluding judicial oversight existed. Id. at 1083. 
 110. For example, the court in Beanal determined that the plaintiff’s allegations of 
violations of international law with respect to the environment relied upon treaties that 
merely referred to a “general sense of environmental responsibility and state abstract 
rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regulations to iden-
tify practices that constitute international environmental abuses or torts,” and thus were 
not cognizable under the ATCA. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161, 
167 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 111. While the decision to wage war is certainly a state decision with serious political 
repercussions, the courts do not refuse to hear cases solely because they implicate politi-
cal questions. See, e.g., In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 64. The court noted that 
even when a case “may call for an assessment of the President’s actions during wartime,” 
this was “no reason for a court to abstain” and “that [p]residential powers are limited 
even in wartime.” Id. at 64. Furthermore, the court declared that “[i]t is not a defense that 
the spraying of herbicides was on orders of the President: Authorization by the head of 
government does not provide carte blanche for a private defendant to harm individualism 
violation of international law.” The court noted further that “[i]n the Third Reich all pow-
er of the state was centered in Hitler; yet his orders did not serve as a defense at Nurem-
berg. Justiciability is not eliminated because of possible interference with executive pow-
er even in wartime.” See also Sarei, 456 F.3d at 1081–84 (finding that the political ques-
tion raised by the defense failed to bar jurisdiction despite the statement of interest pro-
vided by the government). 
 112. For example, in a list of the top one-hundred world leaders in the defense indus-
try, forty-three of the top one hundred were U.S. companies; the top ten included seven 
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ATCA litigation. Thus, this Note will seek to establish links between the 
U.S. government and these industries to demonstrate the viability of the 
ATCA in the context of a war-related environmental harm. 
There is ample evidence that the defense industry has deep ties to the 
political regime in the United States.113 It is not surprising that the indus-
try cultivates such ties given the fact that U.S. decisions to engage in mil-
itary operations bring financial windfalls to companies that manufacture 
weapons.114 With so much money at stake, these corporations invest con-
siderable sums to persuade Congress to award them lucrative defense 
contracts.115 This lobbying effort, in turn, is likely to pay off, especially 
in the current administration where policy makers have extensive finan-
cial ties to the arms industry.116 In fact, the huge contracts awarded such 
defense contractors as Lockheed Martin suggest that these government-
                                                                                                             
U.S. companies, including Lockheed Martin, which was ranked number one. Defense 
News Top 100, DEFENSENEWS.COM, available at http://dfn.dnmediagroup.com/index. 
php?S=06top100 (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 113. See infra note 116 (providing information regarding the personnel links between 
the government and military contractors). 
 114. Evidence of the financial rewards associated with U.S. military engagement in-
clude a rise in stock shares in several major weapons manufacturing corporations includ-
ing Northrop Grumman (increases in stock prices following September 11 and after 
bombing in Afghanistan began), Raytheon, and Lockheed Martin. Frida Berrigan, The 
War Profiteers: How are Weapons Manufacturers Faring in the War?, COMMON DREAMS 
NEWSCENTER, Dec. 18, 2001, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views01 
/1218-03.htm. 
 115. For example, Lockheed Martin invested over $9.8 million lobbying Congress in 
2000. Berrigan, supra note 114. See also supra, note 117 (regarding the dollar amount of 
Lockheed’s contract in 2000 and 2001). 
 116. As of May 2002, the Bush Administration had thirty-two policy makers with 
“significant financial ties to the arms industry” before their appointments, including Vice 
President Cheney and his wife Lynne, who received more than $500,000 as a director on 
the board of Lockheed Martin from 1994–2001. William D. Hartung & Jonathan Rein-
gold, About Face: The Role of the Arms Lobby in the Bush Administration’s Radical 
Reversal of Two Decades of U.S. Nuclear Policy, THE GLOBAL POLICY INSTITUTE, May 
2002, at 13, available at http://www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/reports/About 
Face5.6.02.pdf (see “Through the Revolving Door”) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). Other 
notable members of the administration at this time (May 2002) with such ties included 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, Vice President Cheney’s 
Chief of Staff, Secretary of State Colin Powell, among several others. Id. at 20. Besides 
seeking influence by lobbying Congress directly, numerous weapons contractors such as 
Boeing, General Atomics, General Dynamics, Litton, Lockheed Martin, Northrop 
Grumman, Textron, Thiokol and TRW, have donated money to the corporate think-tank 
Center for Security Policy (“CSP”), which advocates the development of nuclear weap-
ons and opposes arms control agreements. CSP, in turn, has “close ties to influential leg-
islators . . . in the forefront of influencing U.S. nuclear and missile defense policies.” 
Several of these legislators sit on the board of CSP. Id. at 28. 
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corporate interrelationships have proven very beneficial to the indus-
try.117 Furthermore, the development of Pentagon policy has also been 
shaped by the cooperative advocacy of conservative think-tanks staffed 
by numerous individuals who work for defense contractors.118 Attempts 
to influence military engagement do not stop at helping to shape policy 
or lobbying for contracts. There is evidence that defense contractors ac-
tively engage in campaigning for military action.119 
The links between the defense industry and the state here go beyond an 
overlap of personnel and philosophy of war-making. The development of 
military technology is a shared enterprise of the government and the con-
tractors. The Pentagon works with the contractors to design weapons120 
and can exert control over the distribution of such technology world-
wide.121 
                                                                                                             
 117. Lockheed Martin had contracts worth almost $30 billion in fiscal years 2000 and 
2001 alone. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 14. 
 118. The National Institute for Public Policy (“NIPP”) produced a report that consid-
erably influenced the Pentagon’s Nuclear Posture Review, evidenced by the similarity of 
logic and language found in both documents. NIPP, in turn has board members who are 
directly engaged in the weapons manufacturing industry, such as Charles Kupperman, 
Vice President for National Missile Defense Programs at Lockheed Martin. Hartung & 
Reingold, supra note 116, at 30. 
 119. Lockheed’s former vice-president Bruce Jackson was chair of the Coalition for 
the Liberation of Iraq, a group that promoted Bush’s plan to invade Iraq. Jackson was 
also involved in securing support for the war in Eastern Europe; Jackson even provided 
assistance in drafting the letter of endorsement for such military intervention for these 
countries. Corpwatch: Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, available at http://www. 
corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type=9^printsafe=1, (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). 
 120. For example, the Pentagon communicates its needs to contractors by “simu-
lat[ing] the features and performances of weapon systems in computers” before the con-
tractors begin production. Joshua A. Kutner, Robust Weapons Simulations Hinge on 
Close Collaboration, NATIONAL DEFENSE BUSINESS AND TECHNOLOGY MAGAZINE, Jan. 
2001, available at http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2001/Jan/Robust 
_Weapon.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2008). This simulations-based acquisition system 
(“SBA”) allows “[t]he military services and contractors [to] work together to simulate all 
aspects of a weapon system, such as design and performance, leading up to the develop-
ment of a prototype. The military customer tells the contractor what properties it wants 
the system to have, and the contractor incorporates those into the simulation. The con-
tractor then can offer suggestions to improve the system.” Id. The Joint Strike Fighter 
(“JSF”) and the DD-21 surface combatant were products of such a collaboration. Id. 
Lockheed Martin is a manufacturer of the JSF. Lockheed Martin, JSF Program, available 
at http://www.lockheedmartin.com/products/f35/JSFProgram.html (last visited Feb. 8, 
2008). Northrop Grumman was given a contract to build the DD 21 in 1998. Press Re-
lease, Northrop Grumman Ship Systems (Aug. 17, 1998), available at http://www.ss. 
northropgrumman.com/press/news/m_08_17_98.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2008). 
 121. For example, the Pentagon expressed reluctance to share the technology associ-
ated with the Joint Strike Fighter. Renae Merle, Iraq Coverage Helps Arms Exporters, 
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Furthermore, with the increasing reliance of the government on private 
military contractors122 to carry out a wide range of duties, the link be-
tween the state and the contractors has grown tighter. Contractors known 
for their weapons manufacturing capability are now branching out to 
provide other services such as training military personnel and providing 
interrogators for prisons.123 
Given the substantial links between the military contractors and the 
state, their aligned efforts in establishing policy,124 developing weapons, 
and engaging in other war-time activities,125 the actions of private mili-
tary contractors can clearly be linked to the state for the purposes of find-
ing liability for environmental war crimes under the ATCA.126 
The color of law rule derived from Kadic,127 that a private individual or 
entity acts under color of law when acting “together with state officials 
                                                                                                             
Corpwatch.org, Apr. 1, 2003, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id= 
7871&printsafe=1 (last visited Nov. 24, 2006). The Joint Strike Fighter is a combat jet 
built by Lockheed pursuant to a contract worth $200 billion. War Profiteer of the Month: 
Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list=type&type 
=9&all=1(last visited Jan. 28, 2008). 
 122. During the first Gulf War in 1991, the ratio of contractors to military personnel 
was 1:50; in the 2003 conflict, it was 1:10. David Isenberg, A Fistful of Contractors: The 
Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq, PMC Sector: A 
Marriage Between Government and the Private Sector, AMERICAN BRITISH SECURITY 
INFORMATION COUNCIL, available at http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004PMC2ii 
.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2006). 
 123. For example, Northrop Grumman’s subsidiary, Vinnell Corporation obtained a 
forty-eight million dollar contract to train the Iraqi National Army. Corpwatch: Northrop 
Grumman, Corpwatch.org, available at http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?list 
=type&type=11&printsafe=1 (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). Also, Sytex, a subsidiary of 
Lockheed, plays a significant role recruiting private interrogators operating in U.S.-run 
prisons in Iraq and Afghanistan. See Pratap Chatterjee, Meet the New Interrogators: 
Lockheed Martin, Corpwatch.org, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.corpwatch.org 
/article.php?id=12757. 
 124. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116. 
 125. See supra notes 118 and 119. 
 126. Courts have found private actors can be implicated in state action under several 
theories including the theories of joint-action with a state, acting under color of law, and 
aiding and abetting state actors. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Talisman Energy, 
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that state actors are “considered 
state actors if they are willful participant[s] in joint action with the State or its agents”) 
(citations omitted); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 245 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[a] private individual acts under color of law within the meaning 
of section 1983 when he acts together with state officials or with significant state aid”) 
(citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 
456 F.3d 1069, 1078 n.5 (2006) (holding that “violations of the law of nations have al-
ways encompassed vicarious liability”). 
 127. Kadic, 70 F. 3d 232. 
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or significant state aid”128 is applicable here. The defense contractors 
work with state officials to shape policy and develop weapons.129 They 
also receive significant state aid in securing contracts, given the close 
relationship that exists between the contractors and their representatives 
in the administration.130 Secondly, the aiding and abetting theory articu-
lated by the court in Unocal,131 holding liable a private entity that pro-
vides “practical assistance or encouragement which has substantial effect 
on the perpetration of the crime,” applies to defense contractors as 
well.132 The practical assistance is found in many instances: designing 
weapons, training personnel to use aircraft, and other operations.133 The 
encouragement is found in active lobbying and policy-making efforts.134 
The perpetration of the environmental war crime is thus the result of 
teamwork between the state and the defense contractor.135 
CONCLUSION 
The potential for massive casualties and irrevocable environmental 
harm in armed conflict is greater today than ever before. The salting of 
fields in Carthage, or the burning of crops and killing of livestock, are 
trivial events compared to the long term environmental disasters brought 
on by modern day weaponry, and the intensive assaults that they afford 
the military. Furthermore, there exists no criminal justice mechanism 
sufficient to bring rogue states to justice;136 states are also shielded by the 
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity against civil litigation.137 When 
                                                                                                             
 128. Id. at 245. 
 129. See supra notes 116 (policy) and 120 (developing weapons). 
 130. Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 30. 
 131. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See Kutner, supra note 20. 
 134. See Hartung & Reingold, supra note 116, at 30. 
 135. In domestic lawsuits, military contractors have resorted to the military contractor 
defense. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 
1987) (finding that the defense contractor is shielded from liabilities “for injuries caused 
by products ordered by the government for a distinctly military use, so long as it informs 
the government of known hazards or the information possessed by the government re-
garding those hazards is equal to that possessed by the contractor.” However, when this 
defense was asserted in a lawsuit against Dow Chemical (producers of Agent Orange) 
under the ATCA, the court held that it was invalid. 
 136. Supra pages 9–13 and accompanying text explaining the failure of international 
mechanisms to punish those who commit environmental war crimes. 
 137. See FOREL, supra note 66, § 451. “Under international law, a state or state in-
strumentality is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state, except with 
respect to claims arising out of activities of the kind that may be carried on by private 
persons.” Id. Section 451 also discusses U.S. adherence to the “restrictive theory of im-
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the same privileges of immunity are extended to corporations involved in 
warfare, accountability for humanitarian violations ceases.138 
States in the international community implicitly acknowledge that the 
victims of decisions to destroy the infrastructure and environment are 
entitled to compensation.139 However, one problem is the funding of such 
compensation. Under the current regime of accountability, U.S. taxpay-
ers are compelled to pay for weapons designed to safeguard their own 
country, and often to subsidize the weaponry of a foreign state.140 The 
state may justify this in the interests of national security. On the other 
hand, the taxpayer is billed again to clean up the damage done, while 
corporate entities reap the profits and incur none of the liabilities. 
The goal of ATCA suits is twofold: heightening public awareness of 
environmental war crimes and those who perpetrate them and compen-
sating the victims of the crimes, which in this case means providing the 
funds to restore the environment as much as possible to its condition 
prior to the armed attack. The ATCA has been asserted with mixed re-
sults.141 When successful, it may fail to bring financial relief,142 though it 
                                                                                                             
munity,” which maintains that “a state is immune from any exercise of judicial jurisdic-
tion by another state in respect of claims arising out of governmental activities.” Id. at 
cmt. a. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605 articulates exceptions to the immunity, stating that the actions 
of the foreign state must either occur in, or have a direct effect on the United States. See § 
1605(a)(1)–(5). 
 138. Adding weight to this argument is the point made by Londis that nation states 
have “diminished power . . . in the globalized context,” while “[c]orporations are . . . 
immensely powerful (often more so than governments) yet highly unregulated.” Londis, 
supra note 99 at 180. Londis also points out that transnational corporations “are both 
public and private entities—public actors engaged in ventures with foreign governments, 
and private actors engaged in business for profit” such that “the distinction between pub-
lic and private breaks down.” Thus, the corporation comes less and less to represent the 
interests of the state. “Consequently, [such corporations] may be held to the rule of inter-
national law without disrupting the relationships among nation-states.” Id. at 195. 
 139. The United Nations Compensation Commission fund is an example of such rec-
ognition. The United Nations Compensation Commission, http://www2.unog.ch/uncc/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2008). 
 140. For example, Berrigan asserts that “the United States provides 20% of the Israeli 
military budget on an annual basis, and then about 70% of that money provided by the 
United States, from U.S. taxpayers, to Israel is then spent on weapons from Lockheed 
Martin and Boeing and Raytheon.” U.S. Arming of Israel, supra note 48 (last visited Jan. 
31, 2008). 
 141. Of the thirty-six corporate ATCA cases brought over the past thirteen years, twen-
ty have been dismissed (three quarters of these on substantive legal grounds and one 
quarter on procedural grounds). “Three have been settled out of court and 13 are ongo-
ing.” Baue, supra note 15, at 12. 
 142. For example, Bosnian plaintiffs suing General Karadzic for human rights abuses 
under the ATCA were awarded $4.5 billion but have not been able to collect that award. 
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may provide a sense of closure or satisfaction to the victims, as well as 
international attention to the crimes perpetrated against them. Other 
times, the plaintiffs have not won in court but have been able to negotiate 
settlements; this is particularly true in the context of suits against corpo-
rations.143 That the ATCA has potential as a means of deterring corporate 
misfeasors is evidenced in the way it is perceived as a serious threat by 
some corporate advocates.144 Another view of this potential is a positive 
one—it can be used to redress violations that as of yet have not been se-
riously addressed by the international community. It may not be a “wea-
pon of mass destruction” but it certainly is a means to pierce the immu-
nity of state-like corporations who wield their strength to destroy the en-
vironment and are never forced to pay the consequences for their actions. 
That the state actively encourages such behavior is not an adequate de-
fense, especially when the representatives of the state and the corporate 
leaders are often of one mind. 
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